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At the dawn of the twenty-first century, something rather unexpected happened: religion 
became significant again. Since the time of the Enlightenment, great thinkers had been quick 
to predict that religion would vanish in modern rational society and throughout the twentieth 
century this broadly became the case. However, the events of the late twentieth and twenty-
first centuries have questioned these long held expectations about the decline of religion.  
One of the most noteworthy, but often overlooked, changes relates to law. Religious freedom 
is now recognised as a human right and discrimination on grounds of religion or belief has 
become explicitly prohibited. These new laws have led to a significant increase in litigation 
and discussion of ‘religious rights’ (a process which may be referred to as the ‘juridification 
of religion’). And long-standing assumptions and values have become questioned.  The 
relationship between law and religion has become increasingly important and increasing 
controversial.  This paper looks at several recent high profile effects in order to determine 
the effect of this ‘juridification of religion’. Cases concerning prayers said at Council 
meetings, refusals to give urine samples and protests outside St Pauls Cathedral will be 
amongst those examined to determine whether judges truly understand religion and the extent 
to which the new legal framework is working.  
 
A Scandal in Bideford  
In February 2012, the High Court decision in National Secular Society v Bideford Town 
Council
2
 caught the attention of the media. The case concerned a former councillor who 
challenged the Town Council‟s practice of having prayers at the beginning of their council 
meetings. The tone of the media coverage suggested that this was another one of those cases 
where traditional British values were being challenged by new and dangerous laws. However, 
reference to the Law Reports points to a slightly different conclusion.  
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 This paper was originally presented at a staff seminar in Keele University on 21 March 2012.  
2
 [2012] EWHC 175 (Admin). 
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It is correct that the former councillor, Mr Bone, argued that the practice of saying prayers 
breached his right not to be (indirectly) discriminated against on grounds of non-belief under 
the Equality Act 2010
3
 and his right to freedom of religion under Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
4
  However, both of these arguments were 
unsuccessful.
5
 The challenge against the practice of saying prayers succeeded because of a 
technicality found in local government law, which has subsequently been removed.
6
  
 
The way in which the case was represented in the media points to one of the main ironies 
concerning the interaction between law and religion in twenty-first century Britain. 
Ironically, although the last decade has seen the enactment of many laws protecting religious 
freedom, there is a feeling amongst many religious believers that legal protection has 
decreased rather than increased.  Some Christians have even gone as far as to talk in terms of 
persecution.  For example, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey of Clifton, 
provided a witness statement to the Court of Appeal judgment of McFarlane v Relate
7
 in 
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 See para 57: „If the Council is entitled to have public prayers at its formal meetings, contrary to my first 
conclusion, they are also an optional part of the lawful conduct of Council meetings and business of the Council 
to which Mr Bone was elected, and by the rules of which he has to abide. It is he who is seeking that a lawful 
but optional practice, chosen here by the majority of Councillors, which is the way in which such decisions are 
lawfully made, should be stopped to accommodate his particular lack of beliefs. His beliefs or lack of them have 
in fact been accommodated, and he would be seeking something more than a dispensation or special rule to 
accommodate him. He is seeking that others abandon a practice, lawfully chosen, which it is lawful for them to 
choose, so that he does not have to make any accommodation for them, but they do for him. I do not see that the 
feelings of discomfort or exclusion which he has, and which he says are shared by a number of other actual or 
possible Councillors in the minority on this issue, should be regarded as a discriminatory disadvantage when its 
elimination would prevent the degree of comfort or composure which the majority seek being achieved, merely 
substituting one set of uncomfortable feelings for another. ‟ 
4
  See para 74: „The starting point, again, is that, contrary to my first conclusion, there is no statutory bar on the 
practice of saying prayers as they are currently said. Mr Bone is free to stay or leave during prayers. It is in 
accordance with the law. It is not discriminatory, or to the extent that it is, it is justified. I cannot see that his 
freedom of religion, thought or conscience is infringed by the degree of embarrassment he feels, which is no 
more than is inherent in the exercise by the others of their freedom to manifest their religious beliefs, and his 
freedom to stay without participating or to leave. It is their freedom which would be infringed were he right; that 
limitation is not prescribed by law - on the hypothesis that there is no restriction in the LGA 1972. S13 of the 
Human Rights Act is relevant here‟ But see also para 75. 
5
 See para 80: „The saying of prayers as part of the formal meeting of a Council is not lawful under s111 of the 
Local Government Act 1972, and there is no statutory power permitting the practice to continue. If it were 
lawful, the manner in which the practice is carried out in the circumstances of Bideford does not infringe either 
Mr Bone‟s human rights nor does it unlawfully discriminate indirectly against him on the grounds of his lack of 
religious belief‟. 
6
 Section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 stated that a „local authority shall have the power to do 
anything which is, calculated to facilitate, or is conductive or incidental to, the discharge of their functions‟. 
Ouseley J interpreted this as meaning that the saying of prayers as part of the meeting was ultra vires.  Section 
1(1) of the Localism Act 2011now provides that „A local authority has power to do anything that individuals 
generally may do‟. This is now in force in England: Localism Act 2011 (Commencement No. 3) Order No. 411 
7
 [2010] EWCA Civ 880.  The case concerned a Christian counsellor who was dismissed because he refused to 
counsel same-sex couples on sexual matters. See further R Sandberg, „Laws and Religion: Unravelling 
McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd‟ (2010) 12 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 361. 
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which he argued for „a specially constituted Court of Appeal of five Lords Justices who have 
a proven sensibility to religious issues‟,8 expressing concern that: 
 
„recent decisions of the Courts have illuminated insensitivity to the interests and needs 
of the Christian community and represent disturbing Judgments. The effect of these 
decisions is to undermine the religious liberties that have existed in the United 
Kingdom for centuries‟.9 
 
Lord Carey is not alone in raising these concerns. Baroness Warsi has recently warned that 
Britain is under threat from a rising tide of „militant secularisation‟ whereby religion is being 
„sidelined, marginalised and downgraded in the public sphere‟.10   And a recent inquiry by 
Christians in Parliament (an official All-Party Parliamentary Group) concluded that:  
 
„Christians in the UK face problems in living out their faith and these problems have 
been mostly caused and exacerbated by social, cultural and legal changes over the 
past decade.‟11   
 
However, many commentators often express their concerns in slightly more nuanced ways 
than the former Archbishop of Canterbury. For example, the Bishop of Bradford, Nick 
Baines, has commented that:  
 
„I don‟t believe Christians are being persecuted. Having said that, I do think there is 
still a degree of religious illiteracy which is prejudiced against Christians in some 
circumstances‟.12 
 
Although these concerns are ironic given the increase in laws concerning religion, they are by 
no means unsurprising. The last decade has witnessed a clear trend towards what I have 
referred to as „the juridification of religion‟.13 The opening years of the twenty-first century 
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 [2010] EWCA Civ 880, at para. 17.  
9
 See para.  6 of the Witness Statement.  
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 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17021831> and <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9080441/We-
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has seen the enactment of a number of very controversial laws concerning religion, such as 
the Human Rights Act 1998
14
, developments in discrimination law
15
 and religious offences 
such as the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006.
16
 These have promoted the language of 
„religious rights‟ but have led to a number of high profile cases where claims made by 
religious believers have been unsuccessful.  
 
In many of these cases, the unsuccessful outcome has been unsurprising since many claims 
have been vexatious (in part because the intentions of the new laws were misunderstood or 
unclear). However, it is the reasoning employed in such cases rather than the decisions 
themselves that have prompted much academic concern.
17
  Indeed, many of the high profile 
religious rights cases of recent years are currently on the long road to the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg.  The concern is that English courts seem to be interpreting 
religious rights in a very narrow, conservative and Western manner which risks leaving 
Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) moribund and religion 
less protected than the other equality strands found in the Equality Act 2010. And this 
tendency can be terraced back to what can now be seen as a watershed decision in the 
protection of religious freedom in England and Wales: the 2006 decision of the House of 
Lords in R (on the application of Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High 
School
18
. 
 
The Begum Precedent  
The case of Begum attracted a great deal of media and academic comment since it concerned 
the wearing of Islamic dress (a jilbab) at school.  However, the reasoning of the House of 
Lords has proved to be of more importance than its decision.  The case concerned the 
interpretation of Article 9 ECHR, which reads:  
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
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 See ibid chapter 5.  
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 Ibid chapter 6. 
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 Ibid chapter 7. 
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 See, e.g., M Hill and R Sandberg „Is Nothing Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World‟ (2007) Public 
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72.; and N Gibson, „Faith in the Courts: Religious Dress and Human Rights‟ (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 
696. 
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community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
 
2. Freedom to manifest one‟s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
There are at least two rights found in Article 9(1): the absolute right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion and the qualified right to manifest religion or belief. This means that 
people can believe whatever you want but once they act on that belief then such 
manifestations can be limited in the circumstances prescribed in Article 9(2). If the court 
holds that there is interference under Article 9(1), it then moves on to discuss whether that 
interference was justified under Article 9(2). 
 
In Begum the House of Lords were unanimous in their disposal of the appeal. However, their 
reasoning differed. Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale held that there had been an interference with 
Article 9(1) but that it had been justified under Article 9(2). In contrast, Lords Bingham, 
Hoffmann and Scott held that there had been no interference with Article 9(1). The school‟s 
refusal to allow a pupil to wear religious dress did not interfere with that pupil‟s religious 
freedom.  It is the reasoning of Lords Bingham, Hoffmann and Scott that has proved to be 
influential.  
 
Paragraphs 23 and 24 of Lord Bingham‟s speech have proved particularly important. Lord 
Bingham began paragraph 23 by suggesting: 
 
„The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the 
right to manifest religious belief in practice or observance where a person has 
voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that 
practice or observance and there are other means open to the person to practise or 
observe his or her religion without undue hardship or inconvenience‟.  
 
After citing a series of Strasbourg cases in support of this proposition, his Lordship 
concluded in paragraph 24 as follows:    
6 
 
„the authorities do in my opinion support the proposition with which I prefaced para 
23 of this opinion. Even if it be accepted that the Strasbourg institutions have erred on 
the side of strictness in rejecting complaints of interference, there remains a coherent 
and remarkably consistent body of authority which our domestic courts must take into 
account and which shows that interference is not easily established.‟ 
 
That final sentence has been quoted in several judgments since, often to support a finding that 
there has been no interference with the claimant‟s Article 9 rights.  It is that final remark that 
I find problematic. On my reading of Strasbourg jurisprudence to state that „interference is 
not easily established‟ is to over-state the law. This sentence has far too often been 
interpreted to mean that interference will not be readily established and has warranted the 
placing of high thresholds that need to be met before Article 9(1) can be said to have been 
engaged.  Moreover, there is doubt as to what the „coherent and remarkably consistent body 
of authority‟ Lord Bingham refers to actually says.  
 
This requires us to turn our attention back to Lord Bingham‟s proposition found at the start of 
paragraph 23:  
 
„The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the 
right to manifest religious belief in practice or observance where a person has 
voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that 
practice or observance and there are other means open to the person to practise or 
observe his or her religion without undue hardship or inconvenience‟.  
 
First of all, it is important to note that Lord Bingham was perfectly correct to say that there 
have been occasions where Strasbourg institutions had held that there had been no 
interference with Article 9(1). A number of „filtering devices‟ have been suggested and used 
for this purpose:
19
 most notably the assertion in Arrowsmith v United Kingdom,
20
 that the 
term practice „does not cover each act which is motivated or influenced by a religion or a 
belief‟ and that Article 9 was not interfered with where although the act was „motivated or 
influenced‟ by the claimant‟s belief, it did not „actually express the belief concerned‟.   
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 See R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) chapter 5. 
20
 (1981) 3 EHRR 218. 
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It is also worth noting, however, that the Strasbourg case law on Article 9 is still very much 
in its infancy and that the more recent decisions by the Court tend to focus less on the 
question of interference under Article 9(1), preferring instead to focus on the question of 
interference under Article 9(2). 
 
Moreover, there is some doubt as to the parameters of the particular rule Lord Bingham is 
referring to. It is important to make two different interpretations of the rule: one emphasising 
the first element of the rule; the second emphasising the second element. Lord Bingham‟s 
rule is that there will be no interference „where a person has voluntarily accepted an 
employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or observance and there are 
other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her religion without undue 
hardship or inconvenience‟.21 
 
The first interpretation places emphasis upon the first part of the rule („where a person has 
voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or 
observance‟). On my reading, this is an elucidation of what I have referred to as the „specific 
situation rule‟.  I have defined this as follows: 
 
„[The specific situation rule] recognises that a person‟s Article 9 rights may be 
influenced by the particular situation of the individual claiming that freedom. This 
principle is not of universal application: it only applies where someone has voluntarily 
submitted themselves to a system of norms, usually by means of a contract. This 
voluntary submission creates a “specific situation” which limits the claimant‟s right to 
manifest‟.22 
 
The rule often boils down to freedom of contract. If a person has voluntarily submitted 
themselves to a system of norms they cannot subsequently claim a breach of their Article 9 
rights. If I sign a contract to become a school teacher, I cannot then bring an Article 9 claim 
on the basis that I am not permitted to leave the school to worship on a Friday.  
 
                                                 
21
 Emphasis added.  
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 R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 84-85. 
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The Strasbourg case law provides examples of how this rule has been applied.  For example, 
it has been applied in relation to a detained person,
23
 a person who voluntarily submits to 
military service,
24
 a person who voluntarily enters into a contract of employment
25
 and those 
who voluntarily enrol at a university.
26
  
 
The cases cited by Lord Bingham in Begum all relate to similar „specific situations‟. Indeed, 
at paragraph 22 of his speech Lord Bingham cites two Strasbourg decisions which seem in 
line with my understanding of the specific situation rule.  His Lordship quoted from Kalaç v 
Turkey
27
 in which it was noted that: 
  
„Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief. 
Moreover, in exercising his freedom to manifest his religion, an individual may need 
to take his specific situation into account‟. 
 
And also noted that the Commission ruled to similar effect in Ahmad v United Kingdom
28
 
 
„the freedom of religion, as guaranteed by Article 9, is not absolute, but subject to the 
limitations set out in Article 9(2). Moreover, it may, as regards the modality of a 
particular religious manifestation, be influenced by the situation of the person 
claiming that freedom.‟ 
 
Lord Bingham also quoted from the speech of Lord Nicholls in R v Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson
29
, in which it was stated that:  
 
„What constitutes interference depends on all the circumstances of the case, including 
the extent to which in the circumstances an individual can reasonably expect to be at 
liberty to manifest his beliefs in practice‟.30 
 
                                                 
23
 X v United Kingdom (1974) 1 D& R 41 (on the basis that the prisoner had broken his contract with society). 
24
 Kalaç v Turkey (1997) 27 EHRR 552. 
25
 Stedman v United Kingdom (1997) 5 EHRLR 544; Ahmad v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 126. 
26
 Karaduman v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 93. 
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 (1997) 27 EHRR 552, para 27. 
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29
 [2005] UKHL 15. 
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 Para 38.  
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Although this might sound like a broader version of the specific situation rule, Lord Nicholls 
then went on to cite the extract from Kalac given above and then went on to hold that: 
 
„In the present case there is no comparable special feature affecting the position of the 
claimant parents.‟31 
 
This would seem to emphasize how the rule is not of general application.  
 
However, there is a second possible interpretation of Lord Bingham‟s rule that draws the rule 
in broader terms than I have understood the specific situation rule. This interpretation places 
a greater emphasis upon the second part of the rule:  
 
„The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the 
right to manifest religious belief in practice or observance where a person has 
voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that 
practice or observance and there are other means open to the person to practise or 
observe his or her religion without undue hardship or inconvenience’.32  
 
This aspect of the rule suggests that there is no interference with Article 9 where the there are 
other ways open to the claimant to manifest their religion.  This aspect of the rule is 
emphasized by Malehia Malik in her understanding of what she refers to as the „contracting 
out doctrine‟.33  In her feminist judgment on the Begum case she writes that:  
 
„the contracting out doctrine is based on the idea that there is no interference with 
freedom of religion where the individual is left with a viable and voluntary choice to 
put themselves in a position where they can manifest their religion, even if this 
requires some personal sacrifice.‟34 
 
                                                 
31
 Para 39. 
32
 Emphasis added.  
33
 M Malik, „Judgment: R (SB) v Denbigh High School‟ in R Hunter et al (eds) Feminist Judgments: From 
Theory to Practice (Hart, 2010).  
34
 Para 9. 
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This does not mean that the first limb of the test is redundant.
35
  However, the contracting out 
doctrine does seem to place more emphasis upon this second aspect of Lord Bingham‟s rule. 
Indeed, under Malik‟s interpretation the word „and‟ in Lord Bingham‟s test seems to become 
an „or‟: 
 
„where an individual either puts themselves into a situation that restricts their religious 
freedom in some way, or has a choice that would allow them to change their situation 
in a way that allows them to exercise their religious freedom, it is assumed that there 
has been no interference‟.36 
 
This emphasis seems to be followed in Begum itself with considerable stress being placed 
upon the issue of whether she could have gone to another school. In contrast, less attention is 
given to the question of whether Begum voluntarily submitted to the system of norms; though 
as Baroness Hale suggested this is a significant issue based on the facts.
37
 
 
„Most of your lordships take the view that Shabina Begum‟s right to manifest her 
religion was not infringed because she had chosen to attend this school knowing full 
well what the school uniform was. It was she who had changed her mind about what 
her religion required of her, rather than the school which had changed its policy. I am 
uneasy about this. The reality is that the choice of secondary school is usually made 
by parents or guardians rather than by the child herself. The child is on the brink of, 
but has not yet reached, adolescence. She may have views but they are unlikely to be 
decisive. More importantly, she has not yet reached the critical stage in her 
development where this particular choice may matter to her‟.38 
 
Although the Strasbourg institutions have not been consistent in their articulation and 
application of this principle, it would seem to be the case that the emphasis upon the second 
limb of the test in Begum is out of step with the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  This is shown by 
                                                 
35
 Malik seems to suggest that it is the voluntary acceptance of a situation where the religious practice is not 
permitted that brings about the choice element: „In these fact situations individuals have, thorough exercise of 
choice, put themselves in a situation which limits their ability to manifest their religion‟: para 9. 
36
 Para 6.  
37
 Malik makes a similar point: M Malik, „Judgment: R (SB) v Denbigh High School‟ in R Hunter et al (eds) 
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38
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the case of Şahin v Turkey39, concerning a university regulation banning a student from 
wearing a headscarf at enrolment, lectures and examinations. The facts of the case were more 
in keeping with both the „specific situation rule‟ and the „contracting out doctrine‟ as 
discussed above. However, although the Court noted vaguely that „Article 9 does not protect 
every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief and does not in all cases  
guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated by a belief‟,40 the 
Court proceeded „on the assumption that the regulations in issue, which placed restrictions of 
place and manner on the right to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities, constituted an 
interference with the applicant‟s right to manifest her religion.41 In other words, the approach 
favoured by Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale in Begum was taken: it was held that there had 
been an interference with Article 9(1) it had been justified under Article 9(2). 
 
Şahin v Turkey seems typical of the approach usually taken by Strasbourg but there is one 
notable exception to this trend:  in Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek 
v France
42
 Strasbourg seemed to go further by imposing an „impossibility test‟: the Court 
commented that an „alternative means of accommodating religious beliefs had … to be 
“impossible” before a claim of interference under article 9 could succeed‟. This would give 
general application to the rule, effectively meaning that only the second part of Lord 
Bingham‟s rule stands.  
 
However, both Strasbourg and domestic courts have declined to follow the Jewish Liturgical 
case.  As Lord Nicholls noted in Williamson
43
: 
 
„In passing, I doubt whether by the use of the word “impossible” in Jewish Liturgical 
Association Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France (2000) 9 BHRC 27, 46, para 80, the 
European Court of Human Rights was intending to enunciate a standard which is less 
protective. That would be inconsistent with the bedrock principle that human rights 
Conventions are intended to afford practical and effective protection to human rights. 
The court's decision in that case was based on the apparent ease with which the 
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 (2005) 41 EHRR 8. 
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 Para 66. 
41
 Para 71. 
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 (2000) 9 BHRC 27. 
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 [2005] UKHL 15. 
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applicant association could obtain supplies of “glatt” kosher meat elsewhere, as noted 
in paras 81-83 of its judgment‟.44 
 
Lord Bingham referred to this in Begum
45
 while Lord Hoffmann also seemed to doubt the 
Jewish Liturgical rule, commenting:  „“Impossible” may be setting the test rather high but in 
the present case there is nothing to show that Shabina would have even found it difficult to go 
to another school‟.46 
 
However, ironically, the way in which the majority of the House saw the fact that she could 
go to another school was definitive means that English law moved towards this „impossibility 
test‟. The focus on the second limb of Lord Bingham‟s test meant that the emphasis was on 
the possibility of „contracting-out‟ rather than the identification of a specific situation rule. 
This means that the rule now has general effect.   
 
A Uniform Approach
47
 
A series of cases concerning school uniforms followed Begum by holding that there was no 
interference with Article 9 since the claimant was free to go to another school.  
 
In R (on the application of X) v Y School
48
 Silber J grappled with the two elements of Lord 
Bingham‟s rule, labelling them as follows: 
 
„The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the 
right to manifest religious belief in practice or observance [A] where a person has 
voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that 
practice or observance and [B] there are other means open to the person to practise or 
observe his or her religion without undue hardship or inconvenience‟. 
 
Silber J effectively concluded that the „and‟ between limbs A and B should be read as if it 
said „or‟. He held that: 
 
                                                 
44
 At para 38. 
45
 [2006] UKHL 15 at para 24.  
46
 At para 52.  
47
 See further R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 92-93. 
48
 [2006] EWHC (Admin) 298. 
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„the passage from Lord Bingham's speech, which I quoted in paragraph 26 above does 
not state that there will not be breach of article 9 rights only in a case in which the 
requirements of each of the limbs (A) and (B) is satisfied‟.49 
  
Silber J held that he was „persuaded that the claimant's article 9 rights have not been 
infringed by the school's decision not to allow her to wear the niqab for four reasons‟:50 
 
1. Lord Scott in Begum had held that there would be no interference with Article 9 
„where the individual has a choice whether or not to avail himself or herself of the 
services of that institution, and where other public institutions offering similar 
services, and whose rules do not include the objectionable rule in question, are 
available‟.51 
 
2. Lord Hoffmann in Begum had said that „Article 9 does not require that one should be 
allowed to manifest one's religion at any time and place of one's own choosing‟.52 
 
3. Citing the Jewish Liturgical case, it was observed that „Strasbourg case law shows 
that there is no interference with an article 9 right where there is an alternative place 
at which the services in question can be provided without the objectionable rule in 
question‟.53 
 
4. Lord Bingham in Begum had suggested that the „approach in Strasbourg courts   to 
complaints that an applicant has been unable to manifest his or her religion or belief 
has been to impose a high threshold before interference can be established‟.54  
 
From this reasoning it is clear why Silber J saw the Begum decision as „an insuperable 
barrier‟ to the claim.55 However, these reasons are simply elaborations in Begum of what 
Silber J designated as part B.  They simply explain that aspect of the Lord Bingham‟s rule, 
                                                 
49
 At para 29.  
50
 Para 30.  
51
 Para 31, citing Begum at para 87.  
52
 Para 32, citing Begum at para 50.  
53
 Para 33.  
54
 Para 38, citing Begum at para 24.  
55
 Para 100.  
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failing to observe that part A also needs to be met.  Silber J concluded his analysis by 
observing:  
 
„I have not been shown or found  any decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights or of any English court in which it was held that there was an infringement of 
person's article 9 rights when he or she could without excessive difficulty manifest or 
practice their religion as they wished in another place or in another way. The 
approach in Strasbourg courts  to complaints that an applicant has been unable to 
manifest his or her religion or belief has been to impose a high threshold before 
interference can be established‟.56 
 
The context of this discussion, as shown by the final sentence of the quote, seems to suggest 
that Silber J is regarding the terms „infringement‟ and „interference‟ to be synonymous. If this 
is true, his beginning statement is simply erroneous. Sahin and Williamson are just two 
examples of cases where it was held that there was an interference with Article 9 where the 
claimant could have manifested their religion elsewhere. It is true that both of those Article 9 
claims failed but they did so on grounds of justification not interference. It was accepted that 
the manifestations came within the scope of Article 9(1) but was then held that the 
interference was justified under Article 9(2). 
 
Like X v Y, the decision in R (on the Application of Playfoot (A Child) v Millais School 
Governing Body
57
 followed Begum in placing more emphasis on the fact that the claimant 
could manifest her religion easily at another school. This brings the law in line with the 
questioned impossibility rule found in the Jewish Liturgical case.  
 
The decision in Playfoot concerned the wearing of a „purity ring‟ at school as a sign of sexual 
restraint and the claimant‟s decision to remain a virgin until marriage because she was a 
Christian.  Supperstone QC, sitting as a High Court judge, held that the wearing of a purity 
ring was not a manifestation of her religion for the purposes of Article 9 since:  
 
                                                 
56
 Para 38.  
57
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„In my judgment the act of wearing a ring is not “intimately linked” to the belief in 
chastity before marriage. ... The Claimant was under no obligation, by reason of her 
belief, to wear the ring; nor does she suggest that she was so obliged‟.58  
 
In reaching this conclusion, Supperstone QC relied upon paragraph 32 of Lord Nicholls‟ 
speech in Williamson in which his Lordship observed:   
 
„in deciding whether the claimants' conduct constitutes manifesting a belief in practice 
for the purposes of article 9 one must first identify the nature and scope of the belief. 
If, as here, the belief takes the form of a perceived obligation to act in a specific way, 
then, in principle, doing that act pursuant to that belief is itself a manifestation of that 
belief in practice. In such cases the act is 'intimately linked' to the belief, in the 
Strasbourg phraseology‟. 
 
Lord Nicholls is saying that if an action is obligatory under the religion in question then that 
means that it is likely that doing that action will be seen as a manifestation. However, this  
does not mean that the reverse is true. If an action is not obligatory, it does not follow that it 
cannot be a manifestation. Supperstone QC appears to have overlooked paragraph 33  
Nicholls‟ speech in Williamson which makes this very point:  
 
„This is not to say that a perceived obligation is a prerequisite to manifestation of a 
belief in practice. It is not: see, for instance, Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem 241 DLR 
(4th) 1, esp at 25-26, paras 46-50. I am concerned only to identify what, in principle, 
is sufficient to constitute manifestation in a case where the belief is one of perceived 
obligation‟. 
 
Supperstone QC then went on to consider the rule given by Lord Bingham in Begum. First, he 
noted the evidence of „voluntary acceptance‟, noting that the uniform was publicised to both 
parents and pupils and that „the School was the Claimant's first preference‟.59  No concession 
was made to the fact that the school was probably the parent‟s rather than the child‟s choice 
or that the child‟s religious observance may have changed overtime as she matured. Second, 
he noted „other means by which the Claimant [could] express her belief‟ such as by attaching 
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the ring to her bag, wearing a badge or sticker instead, contributing to PSHE classes on the 
topic or by transferring to another school.
60
 It is doubtful whether such „alternatives‟ would 
have been considered if the claimant had sought to wear an Islamic veil or a Sikh turban.  
Nevertheless, Supperstone QC concluded that this meant that there had been no interference 
under Article 9:   
 
„the Claimant's Article 9 rights have not been interfered with both because she 
voluntarily accepted the uniform policy of the School which does not accommodate 
the wearing of the ring and there are other means open to her to practice her belief 
without undue hardship or inconvenience‟.61 
 
The Rise and Fall of Religious Discrimination Law 
For a time, the extension of discrimination law to specifically prohibit discrimination on 
grounds of religion or belief filled the gap created by Begum.
62
  The only successful case 
concerning the wearing of religious dress at school was successful because it was argued 
solely on grounds of discrimination law: religious freedom was not part of the legal 
arguments.
63
   
 
Laws on indirect discrimination were used to circumvent the rule put forward by Lord 
Bingham in Begum which meant that Article 9 had little application in the employment 
sphere (since employees could simply resign). In particular, a number of indirect 
discrimination claims about working hours and holy days were successful.
64
  If the employer 
changed your working hours in ways which prevented you from manifesting your religion, 
then that constituted discrimination unless it could be shown to be justified.  
 
However, this was not to last.
65
 A number of high profile claims brought under religious 
discrimination laws were dismissed on the basis that there was no „disadvantage‟, as opposed 
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to accepting that there had been a disadvantage but that disadvantage had been justified.  The 
most publicised, and concerning, such case was that of Eweida v British Airways
66
, which 
reached the Court of Appeal.  
 
In Eweida the Court of Appeal held that BA‟s then uniform policy which prohibited the 
wearing of visible religious symbols unless their wearing was mandatory did not constitute 
indirect discrimination.  The Court held that the uniform policy did not put Christians at a 
particular disadvantage because there was no evidence that practising Christians considered 
the visible display of the cross to be a requirement of the Christian faith.  
 
In other words, there is only religious discrimination where a believer is stopped from doing 
something which is obligatory in the faith in question and where their co-religionists agree 
that it is obligatory. This means that fringe beliefs held by a few individuals (including beliefs 
held by a minority of believers within a larger religious group) will be denied protection.  
 
Eweida was followed by the Employment Tribunal decision in Chaplin v Royal Devon & 
Exeter NHS Foundation Trust
67
, which concerned a nurse who wished to wear a crucifix 
around her neck. Despite evidence that another nurse had been asked to remove her cross and 
chain,
68
 the Employment Tribunal held that this other nurse had not been put at a particular 
disadvantage since her religious views were not so strong as to lead her to refuse to comply 
with the policy. It was held that in order for there to be a „particular disadvantage‟, the 
disadvantage needed to be „noteworthy, peculiar or singular‟.69 
 
In Begum, X v Y, Playfoot, Eweida and Chaplin the judges have restricted the scope of the 
new law failing to protect claims which fall outside a conservative view of religion. Those 
who can manifest their religion elsewhere have been excluded and so have those whose 
beliefs are not, in the eyes of the court, required or obligatory to the religion in question or 
those whose beliefs are not shared by the mainstream of the religion.  
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All of these claims were dismissed on grounds of interference / disadvantage.  In all of the 
cases, the question of whether the interference was justified was obiter.  
 
This reliance upon the question of interference is unnecessary because more often than not 
such claims could have been adequately dealt with by focusing upon the question of 
justification.
70
 Increasingly high barriers seem to be placed in front of those who wish to 
enforce what they believe to be their religious rights.
 
And the tendency to focus upon 
semantic questions of interference might not allow the court to examine the merits of the 
case. Cases concerning religious rights require nuanced, fact-specific judgments, which are 
best reached by focussing upon the question of justification. The current case law indicates 
that the judiciary are uncomfortable dealing with religious rights, 
 
clinging to questions of 
interference to deal swiftly with claims. This is not to say that the „religion or belief‟ 
argument always needs to win. However, the „religion or belief‟ argument needs to be 
considered seriously and treated as being as important as other rights.  
 
However, dismissing claims on the basis of interference is convenient. It allows judges to 
dismiss claims by simply applying a legal test.  It is not their fault, they could claim, that the 
case is dismissed. They are simply following the law. And discussing the question of 
justification as a hypothetical obiter question means that difficult questions can be avoided.  
 
Towards a Hierarchy of Rights  
The effect of Begum was that Article 9 became moribund and although new provisions 
outlawing religious discrimination provided some remedy in lieu of Article 9, the case of 
Eweida shows that a restrictive approach has also been taken there.  This has meant that 
religious rights are easily „trumped‟ by other rights.71 This is especially true of a number of 
high profile cases where there has been a clash between discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation and discrimination on grounds of religion. Rather than attempting to balance these 
rights, courts and tribunals have readily accepted that the need to eliminate discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation is an answer to a charge of religious discrimination.  
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Most notably, the Court of Appeal decision in Ladele v London Borough of Islington
72
 
concerned a registrar who refused on grounds of conscience to perform civil partnership 
ceremonies.  The claim that this constituted indirect discrimination on grounds of religion 
was dismissed on the basis that any disadvantage was justified.
73
  The Court of Appeal held 
that the employer‟s policy of promoting equality on grounds of sexual orientation constituted 
a legitimate aim. For Dyson LJ,  
 
„[The aim of the Council‟s Dignity for All policy] was of general, indeed overarching, 
policy significance [having] fundamental human rights, equality and diversity 
implications, whereas the effect on Ladele of implementing the policy did not 
impinge on her religious beliefs: she remained free to hold those beliefs, and free to 
worship as she wished‟.74  
 
Further, Ladele was employed in a public job and was being „required to perform a purely 
secular task, which was being treated as part of her job‟.75 
 
Aspects of this reasoning are questionable.
76
 The argument seems one-sided. Preventing 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is described as being of „overarching, policy 
significance‟ whilst freedom of religion is defined very narrowly. Surely the equality policy 
protects discrimination on grounds of religion as well as on grounds of sexual orientation. 
Taken literally, the Court of Appeal in Ladele seemed to suggest that freedom of religion 
only included the right to hold beliefs and worship. This is not the case as the text of Article 9 
makes clear. It appears that the laudable aim of preventing discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation was used to annihilate the claim of religious discrimination.  Moreover, 
there seems to be an implicit understanding here that the workplace will be secular and that 
religion can be left at the door, like an overcoat.  Would judges say similar things about other 
equality strands? 
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The effect of Ladele can be shown, for example,
77
 in the High Court decision in R (Eunice 
Johns and Owen Johns) v Derby City Council
78
. The case concerned two would-be foster 
carers who expressed their beliefs concerning homosexuality whilst being interviewed by the 
council.  The claimants formed the view that the defendant was discriminating them on 
religious grounds in that the defendant would not seem to be prepared to approve as foster 
carers any Christians who held similar views as to homosexuality. Accordingly, although the 
Council‟s Fostering Panel simply deferred a decision on whether Mr and Mrs John would be 
suitable foster parents, the claimants launched religious discrimination proceedings.  
 
Munby LJ began by stressing what he regarded as „the obvious point that we live in this 
country in a democratic and pluralistic society, in a secular state not a theocracy‟.79  Most of 
this is not contentious but it is unclear what Munby LJ means by „secular‟.80 In relation to 
indirect discrimination,
81
 Eweida was applied to hold that it had not been shown that there 
had been „particular disadvantage‟ or „group‟ disadvantage to Christians or the particular 
denomination of Christianity since: „It is necessary to show “particular disadvantage” or 
“group” disadvantage to Christians or the particular denomination of Christianity and it is not 
conceded this has been shown here‟.82 
 
Moreover, Munby LJ held that even if there had been a disadvantage then any indirect 
discrimination would have been justified by the defendant‟s need to comply with anti-
discrimination legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination and their equal 
opportunities policies to the same affect:  
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„it is clear on the authorities that compliance with anti-discrimination legislation 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination and the defendant‟s equal opportunities 
policies to the same effect, together with the need to ensure the non-discriminatory 
service provisions ... will amount to justification: see [Ladele].‟83  
 
This seems to suggest that the need not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation will 
always serve as justification to a religious discrimination claim. 
 
Moreover, Munby LJ held that this conclusion was compatible with Article 9.  Again, a rather 
restrictive interpretation was given to the Article,
84
 with Munby LJ observing that:  
 
„Article 9 only provides a “qualified” right to manifest religious belief and that 
interferences in the sphere of employment and analogous spheres are readily found to 
be justified, even where the members of a particular religious group will find it 
difficult in practice to comply‟.85 
 
Although Munby LJ is correct to say that the right to manifest under Article 9 is one of the 
qualified rights under the Convention, his definition of what „qualified‟ seems to say that 
Article 9 is a very limited right. His insistence that interferences „are readily found to be 
justified‟ is particularly noteworthy given that most of the Article 9 cases have failed on 
grounds of interference. And the last sentence goes even further than Begum.  
 
In sum, the pattern found in the case law seems to be as follows: 
 
(i) Article 9 claims are failing on grounds of interference (rather than justification) 
due to the application of the contracting out doctrine (as distinct to the specific 
situation rule). This is shown in by Begum, as followed by X v Y and Playfoot.  
Playfoot also suggested that only obligatory religious practices will be protected. 
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(ii) Although discrimination law has led to some successful cases in the context of 
employment (especially in relation to working hours), a restrictive approach 
seems to be taken in some cases to the question of disadvantage, especially in 
respect of ascertaining whether that disadvantage is shared by co-religionists. This 
is shown in particular by Eweida (which is very much in keeping with the logic of 
Playfoot). 
 
(iii) A series of cases concerning religious and sexual orientation discrimination claims 
(Ladele and Johns v Derby City Council) suggest that the need not to discriminate 
on grounds of sexual orientation will always serve as justification to a religious 
discrimination claim. This seems to be the strongest evidence to date that there 
now exist a hierarchy of rights with religious discrimination coming below other 
equality strands.   
 
However, some recent cases (and a change in stance by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission) have indicated that changes may be afoot.  
 
The Return of Article 9  
A significant and so far overlooked case is the High Court decision in R on the Application of 
Bashir v The Independent Adjudicator and HMP Ryehull and the Secretary of State for 
Justice.
86
 The case concerned a prisoner, was charged with failing to obey a lawful order 
contrary to Rule 51(22) of the Prison Rules 1999 when he failed to provide an adequate 
urine sample as part of the prison’s mandatory drug testing policy.  Although the claimant 
was a devout Muslim who was fasting as part of his religious preparation prior to a Court 
of Appeal appearance, the Independent Adjudicator had found the claimant guilty of failing 
to obey a lawful order. The Prison Service Order PSO 3601 on ‘Mandatory Drug Testing’ 
outlined different rules that could be applied in relation to the collection of urine samples 
during ‘religious festivals which involve total fasting’ but these did not apply in the present 
case since it was not a religious festival. The Adjudicator concluded that although there is 
nothing to stop individuals fasting on other days, they then bear the consequences of this.87  
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At the High court, this adjudication was challenged as being, inter alia, contrary to Article 
9 ECHR.  Pelling QC, sitting as a High Court Judge, quashed the adjudication.  He held 
that the circumstances required the Adjudicator to consider the applicability of Article 9, 
examining whether Article 9 was engaged, whether there was an interference with these 
rights and whether that interference had been justified under Article 9 (2).  Simply 
considering applicability of the religious festival exception was ‘a wrong approach’:88   
 
„The reasons given by the Adjudicator do not suggest that he considered the Article 9 
point at all but rather simply considered the lawfulness issue by reference to the 
applicability of the religious festival exception. That was a wrong approach. The 
circumstances plainly required the applicability of Article 9 to be considered‟.89 
 
As a result, the decision must be quashed since it could not be demonstrated that a 
reasonable Adjudicator correctly directing himself would have necessarily come to a similar 
conclusion as that reached by the Adjudicator in this case.  
 
Unlike many of the cases, discussed above, the High Court in Bashir did not feel the need 
to erect any of the barriers in front of the claimant. Pelling QC held that Article 9 was 
engaged because there was ‘no real doubt’ that the claimant’s fast was intimately linked to 
his religious belief. 90  Moreover, Pelling QC rejected the defendant’s submission that the 
relied on the fact that the fast was not obligatory but voluntary: 
 
‘Although the Defendant relies on the fact that the fast being undertaken by the 
Claimant was not obligatory but voluntary, I reject that as a relevant consideration for 
present purposes.  There is nothing within Article 9 that requires there to be a 
perceived, much less an objectively demonstrable, obligation for the manifestation 
of religious belief to be protectable. Lord Nicholls does not suggest that to be so in 
Paragraph 32 of his Opinion in Williamson. Indeed, he says quite the opposite in 
paragraph 33.  On the evidence before the Adjudicator the Claimant‟s fasting was a 
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manifestation that was motivated or inspired by a religion and was not unreasonable 
and thus satisfied the relevant threshold requirements for Article 9 to be engaged.’91   
 
This corrects the misinterpretation of Williamson in Playfoot (and also seems contrary to 
the spirit of Eweida). However, it also dismantles the distinction drawn in Arrowsmith 
between  manifestations and motivations and seemingly introduces a new reasonableness 
test (which if applied objectively would be contrary to Lord Nicholl’s insistence in 
Williamson that ‘Freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual’.92 
 
Pelling QC also gave short shrift to the adjudicator’s argument that relied upon Lord 
Bingham’s rule in Begum on the basis that:  
 
‘none of the authorities that are considered by Lord Bingham in that paragraph 
concern the position of prisoners. Although it was argued on behalf of the Defendant 
that the Claimant should be treated as having voluntarily accepted the restrictions 
implicit in a prison environment by committing the offences for which he had been 
convicted, I am not convinced that is a correct analysis‟.93 
 
He pointed out that „The only European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) authority cited by 
either party that concerned a prisoner was Jakobski v Poland
94
. This may be the case but 
there are other clear examples of the specific situation rule being applied in the prison 
context, such as in X v United Kingdom
95
. However, if the specific situation rule does not 
apply in a prison setting where the claimant has broken the social contract with society, it is 
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arguable that it should not apply to other situations outside those regulated by a contract of 
employment.  This seems to adopt a much narrower interpretation of the principle than we 
have seen in the cases above.  
 
Further, Pelling QC also adopted a much more generous general approach to the question 
of interference:  
 
„in my judgment the question of whether there has been interference becomes 
essentially a factual one. Having accepted that for the Claimant to embark upon and 
maintain a three day fast which he genuinely believed could not be broken was a 
manifestation of his religious beliefs, it necessarily follows that to require him to 
provide a sample of urine which he was not able to provide without breaking his fast 
was an interference with the Claimant‟s Article 9 rights. Thus, I conclude that the sole 
issue that arises in the circumstances of this case is ... whether the interference is 
prescribed by law, has one of the legitimate aims identified in Article 9(2) and is 
proportionate‟.96  
 
This shifts the focus from the question of interference under Article 9(1) onto the question of 
justification under Article 9(2). Pelling QC concluded that this interference was not justified 
under Article 9(2) in that although the drug testing policy was „prescribed by law‟ and 
fulfilled at least one of the legitimate aims laid out in the Article, it was not proportionate.
97
  
There was no evidence before the Adjudicator concerning the cost or inconvenience of 
making appropriate adjustments in the particular circumstances that arose.
98
 As Pelling QC 
concluded: „There was no evidence before the Adjudicator which enabled him to conclude 
(as apparently he did) that it was proportionate to require all Muslim prisoners engaged in 
personal fasting to break that fast as and when required to do so for the purposes of providing 
a [sample] regardless of the circumstances‟.99   
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Pelling QC stressed that his judgment was not intended to have any effect on the lawfulness 
of the drug testing policy and that the conclusions were „case specific and fact sensitive‟.100 
However, although this case has not been cited, it seems to be representative of a changing 
interpretation of Article 9 in the lower courts. 
 
This can be shown by the treatment of the specific situation rule in National Secular Society v 
Bideford Town Council
101
.  Although the Article 9 claim would have been unsuccessful (on 
the assumption that the saying of prayers was lawful), Ouselely J stated that there had been 
no voluntary submission in this case:  
 
„I do not accept Mr Dingemans‟ argument that because Mr Bone had chosen to stand 
for election to a Council which had this practice, he had accepted the burden of its 
continuance until he could change it by democratic vote.  ... This fails to recognise 
that becoming an elected representative is more than just a job for a politician; it is the 
fundamental right of the electorate to choose whom they wish to represent them in the 
body to which they have elected him. If it is an interference with the right not to hold 
religious views, or if it is an unnecessary or unjustifiable interference or act of 
discrimination, this cannot be treated as a case of voluntary submission.‟102 
 
This would suggest that there remains some limits to the specific situation rule can be 
applied. This tendency not to rely on the notion of contracting out can be further shown by  
recent litigation concerning the „Occupy Movement‟ which formed a camp in St Paul‟s 
Cathedral Churchyard, The Mayor, Commonality and Citizens of London v Tammy 
Samede
103
.   For current purposes, we are concerned only with the argument that allowing the 
camp to remain breached the Article 9 rights of St Paul‟s Cathedral.  Although the Cathedral 
was not a party to the case, this was one of the reasons put forward in the argument that the 
interference with the protestor‟s Article 10 and 11 rights was not justified.  
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In the High Court
104
 Lindblom J held that the City had undoubtedly established that there was 
a pressing social need to not to permit the camp to remain at the Cathedral and that this was 
in part because of the effect the occupation had on the Article 9 rights of the Cathedral: 
 
„I am convinced that the effects of Occupy‟s protest camp in St Paul‟s Churchyard 
have been such as to interfere seriously with the rights, under Article 9 of the 
Convention, of those who desire to worship in the cathedral. ... During the camp‟s 
presence, and, in my view, largely if not totally as a result of its presence, there has 
been a drop of about two fifths in the numbers of those worshipping in the cathedral. 
About the same fraction has been lost in the number of visitors, an important source 
of funds for the upkeep of the building and for its ministry.  ....  Together, and without 
more, [this] would, in my view, justify the granting of relief. I have no hesitation in 
reaching that conclusion even though the Church is not itself a party in the City‟s 
claim and has not issued proceedings of its own.‟105 
 
Like in Bashir, the specific situation rule was held not to apply:  
 
„To say that those who are put off attending services in the cathedral can go and 
worship elsewhere, with more than 450 other churches in the diocese of London to 
choose from, misses the point. It is to misunderstand the nature of the right in Article 
9, which is not that one is entitled to worship only where the activities of others make 
it comfortable or convenient to do so, or where one is made to go by others in the 
exercise of their own Convention rights, but where one chooses to worship in 
accordance with the law.‟ 106 
 
In the Court of Appeal,
107
 the Master of the Rolls upheld the decision of the High Court, 
holding that there was „no chance that any of the criticisms raised by each of the defendants, 
or even all of those criticisms taken together, could persuade an appellate court that his 
decision was wrong‟.108 In relation to the Article 9 point, the appellants contended that  
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„the Judge ought not to have found ... that there was any interference with the rights of 
those who wished to worship at St Paul‟s Cathedral, given that (a) no worshipper gave 
evidence, and (b) the Occupy Movement stands for the same values as the Church of 
England‟. 109 
The Master of the Rolls held that neither of these arguments held sway because:  
 
„As to (a), the Judge was plainly entitled to reach the conclusion that he arrived at. He 
had figures which showed a very significant reduction in worshippers at, and visitors 
to, the Cathedral since the Camp had arrived, and evidence of opinion from the 
Cathedral Registrar that the reduction was caused by the Camp. While there were 
some other possible explanations for the reduction, the Judge was, to put it at its 
lowest, entitled to reach the view that he did. As to point (b), it is true that some 
prominent members of the Church of England have expressed support for the Camp, 
but that is no answer to the Judge‟s concern about the interference by the Camp with 
the access of people who wish to worship in the Cathedral‟.110 
 
The cases of Bashir, Bideford and Samede therefore show a tendency not to rely on the 
notion of contracting out to dismiss Article 9 claims. Although the Article 9 arguments were 
not successful in all these cases, the religious rights dimension seems to be considered in a 
much more mature and nuanced way. This is true of recent cases which have relied upon the 
notion of contracting out but have done so in the context of the Article 9(2) question of 
justification rather than the Article 9(1) question of interference. The decision in National 
Secular Society v Bideford Town Council
111
 provides some evidence of this. Although, as we 
have seen, Ouselely J stated that there had been no voluntary submission, he nevertheless 
considered the notion of contracting out but did so in the context of Article 9 generally.  
 
„Mr Bone is free to stay or leave during prayers. It is in accordance with the law. It is 
not discriminatory, or to the extent that it is, it is justified. I cannot see that his 
freedom of religion, thought or conscience is infringed by the degree of 
embarrassment he feels, which is no more than is inherent in the exercise by the 
others of their freedom to manifest their religious beliefs, and his freedom to stay 
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without participating or to leave. It is their freedom which would be infringed were he 
right .‟112 
 
This conflation of interference and justification issues can also be found in two recent Court 
of Appeal decisions.  
 
Hotel Reservations  
The Court of Appeal decision in Bull & Bull v Hall & Preddy
113
 concerned discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation.  The religious actors, the Bulls, were the defendants not the 
claimants. They were hotel owners who preferred to let double accommodation to 
heterosexual married couples only‟ and so turned away a homosexual couple who had 
entered into a civil partnership. Rafferty LJ held that this constituted direct discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation because a „homosexual couple cannot comply with the 
restriction because each party is of the same sex and therefore cannot marry‟ meaning that 
„the criterion at the heart of the restriction, that the couple should be married, is necessarily 
linked to the characteristic of an heterosexual orientation‟ and there was therefore less 
favourable treatment on grounds of sexual orientation.114 
 
Moreover, Rafferty LJ held that this conclusion was compatible with Article 9.  At first instance, 
Andrew Rutherford, giving the judgment of Bristol County Court held that the hotelier‟s 
Article 9 rights had been affected.
115
 However, this was justified under Article 9(2) because 
„in so far as the regulations [prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation] do 
affect this right they are ... a necessary and proportionate intervention by the state to protect 
the rights of others‟.116 At the very least, it can be said that the treatment of Article 9 here is a 
little cursory.  The suggestion once again that the legal requirement not to discriminate on 
grounds of sexual orientation will automatically justify religious discrimination claims.
117
 
However, there seems to be a welcome step away from the Begum precedent in that at least it 
was accepted that the religious rights were interfered with.  
 
                                                 
112
 Para 72. 
113
 [2012] EWCA Civ 83.  
114
 Para 40.  
115
 Bristol County Court Case No 9BC02095/6 (4
th
 January 2011). 
116
 [2012] EWCA Civ 83 at para 39. 
117
 See also the cases of Ladele and Johns, discussed above.  
30 
 
In the Court of Appeal Rafferty LJ also concluded that: „the extent to which under the 
Regulations the restriction imposed by the Appellants upon the Respondents constitutes 
direct discrimination, and to the extent to which the Regulations limit the manifestation of the 
Appellants‟ religious beliefs, the limitations are necessary in a democratic society for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.‟118  
 
However, in reaching this conclusion Rafferty LJ made reference to the Article 9 case law to 
reach the conclusion that: 
 
„the article did not protect hoteliers who claimed that their “religious beliefs justified 
their refusal to provide double beds to homosexual couples” as “the provision of hotel 
rooms is legal and occurs nowhere other than in an hotel”, and the hoteliers could 
“'manifest [their] beliefs in many ways outside the commercial sphere.”‟119 
 
This would seem to be an application of the contracting out doctrine in the context of 
providing an answer to the question of justification under Article 9(2) (as opposed to its usual 
application in response to the question of interference under Article 9(1)).  Whilst many 
objections concerning the contracting out doctrine continue to apply here, its application 
under Article 9(2) is preferable to its application under Article 9(1). When the rule is applied 
under Article 9(1) then the finding is that there has been no interference with Article 9 and so 
the claim is automatically dismissed.   In contrast, where the rule is applied under Article 9(1) 
then the finding is part of the wider question of justification, allowing the merits of the case 
to be examined. This would therefore appear to be a step in the right direction.  
 
Conscientious Objection 
This approach was also followed in a „classic‟ case of where the specific situation rule would 
be applied. The Court of Appeal in Michael Peter Lyons v R
120
 applied the specific situation 
rule in respect of a Medical Assistant to the Navy who appealed his conviction for 
intentionally disobeying a lawful command, inter alia, on the basis that the order contravened 
his Article 9 rights as a conscientious objector.  Toulson LJ held that current arrangements 
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considering conscientious objection had been followed and that this was not in breach of 
Article 9:  
 
„A person who voluntarily enters military service undertakes serious responsibilities 
potentially involving the lives and safety of others.  If he seeks to be discharged from 
further service on the ground of conscientious objection, it is right that there should be 
a proper process for deciding whether his claim is well-founded.  Until that has been 
established it is necessary and just that he should continue to be subject to the 
requirements of military service and military discipline.  Otherwise he could 
immediately escape from the responsibilities which he had voluntarily accepted, 
regardless of the consequent risk to others and regardless of whether or not his claim 
was well founded.‟121   
 
This is largely uncontroversial. If there is such a rule as the specific situation rule, then it 
clearly applies on these facts.  However, interestingly, the part of the judgment which 
examined the Article 9 claim considered Article 9 as a whole and did not distinguish between 
the questions of interference and justification.  Again, in this case, the specific situation rule 
appears to be applied as part of the analysis of the Article 9(2) question of justification rather 
than the Article 9(1) question of interference: 
 
„the fact that a person has volunteered for military service, and so voluntarily accepted 
the responsibilities which go with such service, may be highly material when 
considering the balance to be struck between the individual‟s conscience and the 
interest of public safety, the protection of public order and the protection of the rights 
of others, to which article 9.2 refers‟.122 
 
This is to be welcomed. It represents a move towards focusing more on the question of 
justification under Article 9(2) rather than dismissing claims under the question of 
interference under Article 9(1).  Michael Peter Lyons is in line with my reading of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence: this is a case where the specific situation rule can be considered. 
So, but to a lesser extent, is Bull & Bull and Bideford.  Moreover, it is pleasing to see a 
number of cases such as Bashir and Samede where the specific situation rule is not applied. 
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Again, on my reading of the Strasbourg jurisprudence that is correct. However, if the Begum 
precedent was applied then all of these cases would have been dismissed under the Article 
9(1) question of interference.  
 
In short, the judiciary appear to be becoming more comfortable with Article 9(1) and are 
more willing to consider that Article 9(1) may be engaged.  The trend, however, is not all one 
way. This is shown by the Court of Appeal decision in President of the Methodist Conference 
v Preston
123
 the latest in a long line of cases concerning whether ministers of religion can be 
regarded as employees.
124
  In New Testament Church of God v Stewart
125
 the Church 
appealed against the finding of the Employment Tribunal that a minister of religion whose 
position as a pastor had been terminated was an employee arguing inter alia, that this 
decision infringed their Article 9 rights. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but 
expressed some enthusiasm for the Article 9 claim. Pill LJ held that the law should not 
readily impose a legal relationship on members of a religious community which would be 
contrary to their religious beliefs while Arden LJ held that: 
 
„A religious organisation may, as one of its beliefs, consider that ministers should not 
have contracts of employment or that the state should not interfere in the way they 
conduct their organisation. If the state interferes with that belief, there may be an 
interference with the group‟s article 9 right (though the interference will not constitute 
a violation of article 9 if the conditions in article 9(2) are satisfied)‟.126 
 
In President of the Methodist Conference v Preston
127
, however, Maurice Kay LJ held that 
Article 9 was not material to the ratio of Stewart.
128
 He held that the „potential role of Article 
9 in cases such as this‟ was „far more modest‟129 and referred to: 
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„the unattractiveness and moral poverty of the attempted invocation of Article 9 in 
this case‟. 130 
 
The Final Problem 
In sum, the pattern found in the most recent case law seems to be as follows: 
 
(i) The most recent cases suggest that a more generous approach is beginning to be 
taken in respect to interference with Article 9. Bashir corrects Playfoot to confirm 
that non-obligatory manifestations may be protected by Article 9 and, together 
with Samede (and to some extent Bideford) show a growing reluctance to rely 
upon the notion of voluntary submission to dismiss claims.  
 
(ii) The decisions in Lyons, Bull & Bull and Bideford suggest that where contracting 
out is an issue, it will now be part of the consideration of Article 9 as a whole.  
These decisions, overall, suggest that the judiciary appear to be becoming more 
comfortable with Article 9(1) and are more willing to consider that Article 9(1) 
may be engaged.  However, the cursory dismissal of the Article 9 claim in Preston 
provides an important exception to this trend.  
 
In short, there are tentative signs that some of the criticisms previously made of the domestic 
Article 9 case law are now being rectified. This is an important qualifier to a recent report by 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission which has identified two concerns in relation to 
the domestic interpretation of Article 9: 
 
„Courts are setting too high a threshold for establishing “interference” with the right 
to manifest a religion or belief, and are therefore not properly addressing whether 
limitations on Article 9 rights are justifiable.‟ 
 
„Indirect discrimination provisions in domestic law covering protection for individual 
beliefs may not be consistent with Article 9‟.131 
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These concerns mirror those identified above.  Moreover, just because there are some 
tentative signs that these concerns are beginning to be addressed, that does not mean that 
these concerns ought to be ignored. Indeed, the encouraging developments described above 
have all been lower court decisions.  It remains to be seen what will happen in the next 
Supreme Court decision. Moreover, the cases currently pending appeal at Strasbourg are 
likely to have a significant effect on how Article 9 is interpreted.  
 
This raises the question of how Article 9 should be interpreted. The short answer is 
increasingly by reference to the question of justification rather than the question of 
interference. However, that is not to say that the question of interference should always 
become a mere formality. The real issue is the scope of the specific situation rule: do we 
follow the tests as laid out by Lord Bingham in Begum and if we do how much emphasis do 
we place on each test. In other words, is it the specific situation rule or the contracting out 
doctrine? 
 
Taking a step backwards, the objections to the specific situation rule / contracting out 
doctrine highlights the main difficulty with current interpretations of religious rights.  It is 
based upon a „binary‟ understanding of identity and authority.  If a believer chooses to enter 
the public sphere then they are expected to leave their religiosity at the door of their 
workplace or school.  There seems to be an acceptance that religious freedom is protected 
provided that the believer has a „right to exit‟ from situations where they are not permitted to 
manifest their religion. This term is often used in the context of concerns about 
discriminatory practices within religious groups. It is argued that the role of the State is 
simply to ensure that people have the option to leave such groups.
132
  Reliance upon the „right 
to exit‟ is flawed in that that context and in the context of a believer in a secular environment. 
As Phillips puts it, the „right to exit‟ alone is insufficient because „voice matters as well as 
exit. The right to leave has to be complemented by the right to stay‟.133   As Shachar argues 
that this right to exit imposes „the burden of solving conflict upon the individual‟ whilst 
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„relieving the state of any responsibility for the situation‟.134 In short, it creates an impossible 
choice.  
  
As the Canadian scholar Shachar has observed, this „binary‟ understanding is fundamentally 
flawed because it is based on an oversimplified “either-or”- type understanding of legal 
authority which is not tailored to respect individuals‟ manifold identities‟. 135  Judges and 
tribunal chairs seem to be operating under the presumption that religion does not affect all 
aspects of a believer‟s life.  Shachar therefore seeks to recognise „the complex and multi-
layered nature of multicultural identity‟.136  She asserts that we cannot „remain blind to the 
web of complex and overlapping affiliations which exist between these competing 
entities‟.137  This point was well made by the Archbishop of Canterbury‟s‟ lecture on 
religious law which relied heavily upon some aspects of Shachar‟s work. Rowan Williams 
asserted that: ‘our social identities are not constituted by one exclusive set of relations or 
mode of belonging‟. He said:  
 
„There is a position – not at all unfamiliar in contemporary discussion – which says 
that to be a citizen is essentially and simply to be under the rule of the uniform law of 
a sovereign state, in such a way that any other relations, commitments or protocols of 
behaviour belong exclusively to the realm of the private and of individual choice.  
[This] is a very unsatisfactory account of political reality in modern societies; but it is 
also a problematic basis for thinking of the legal category of citizenship and the nature 
of human interdependence.‟138 
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Shachar argues that a „new approach to multicultural accommodation must break away from 
the prevailing yet misleading “either your culture or your rights” ultimatum that underpins 
existing solutions‟.139 Shachar‟s solution lies in the acceptance of „joint governance‟ which 
„promises to foster ongoing interaction between different sources of authority, as a means of 
improving the situation of traditionally vulnerable insiders without forcing them to adhere to 
an either/or choice between their culture and their rights‟.140 
 
The recognition of the multi-faceted nature of identity as something which is constantly being 
re-negotiated and the notion that people may feel allegiance to more than one source of 
authority is, of course, by no means novel.  However, these insights seem to have been lost in 
the domestic jurisprudence on Article 9 following Begum. The cases of X v Y School, 
Playfoot and Eweida adopted a simplistic binary understanding of the religious claims. And, 
although recent lower court decisions suggest that certain aspects of this case law have been 
corrected, the problems identified by this paper and by the Equality and Human Right 
Commission have not gone away. It may well be that Strasbourg will provide some steer on 
these issues but only time will tell. It is crude and unhelpful to say that the juridification of 
religion has led to the persecution of religion; but it seems to be the case that the increase in 
language of religious rights has been met with signs of religious illiteracy on the part of some 
judges.  
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